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Epistemic Network Injustice∗
Kai Spiekermann
Forthcoming in Politics, Philosophy and Economics
Abstract
To find out what is in one’s own best interest, it is helpful to ask
one’s epistemic peers. However, identifying one’s epistemic peers is
not a trivial task. I consider a stylized political setting, an electoral
competition of ‘Masses’ and ‘Elites’. To succeed, the Masses need
to know which alternative on offer is truly in their interest. To find
out, the Masses can pool their privately held information in a pre-
election ballot, provided that they can reliably find out with whom
they should pool information. I investigate the process of finding the
relevant peer group for information pooling by modeling this group
formation process as dynamic network change. The simulations show
that the Masses can succeed in finding the right peers, but they also
suggest reasons why the Elites may often be more successful. This
phenomenon generalizes to the notion of Epistemic Network Injus-
tice. Such injustice arises when a subset of citizens is systematically
deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers, leading to their re-
duced political influence. Epistemic Network Injustice is a new form of
epistemic injustice, related to but distinct from the notion introduced
by Miranda Fricker.
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helpful advice, for which I am grateful. The respective developers of the free matplotlib
and networkx libraries are gratefully acknowledged. Finally, special thanks to Bob Goodin
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1 Introduction
If we are uncertain about which political choice is in our best interest, it is
often helpful to consult with others and take their advice into account. But
this strategy comes with a catch — it only works if one asks people with
the same fundamental interests. Asking the wrong people can, at best, be a
waste of time and, at worst, lead to choices against one’s best interest. Since
people are epistemically dependent on others, finding one’s true epistemic
peers matters. For example, registered Republicans voting in a primary may
want to find out which candidate they should support to best promote their
interests. It may be helpful to ask other voters, but not everyone will be
helpful. A free-trade Republican, for example, should perhaps not listen to
a Trump-supporting Republican. For information aggregation purposes it is
pointless and often misleading to follow those who are not your true epistemic
peers, i.e. do not share the same interests.1 At the same time, listening to
one’s true epistemic peers, if one is able to find them, can be very helpful
and might substantially increase the chances for making the right choice. If
a citizen is cut off from those who can help her to learn what is in her true
interest, this person may experience what I will later introduce as ‘Epistemic
Network Injustice’.
Identifying the alternative in one’s interest is not as simple as it might
look. If the relation between means and ends is not transparent then, even
if one is certain about the ends, the choice of means is non-trivial. Since
political choices are rarely directly about ends but much more often about
means to promote ends, knowing what one ‘really’ wants can be particularly
hard in such contexts. This becomes important in elections or referendums.
If all of one group – let’s call them the ‘Masses’ – knew which alternative best
promotes their interest, they would easily beat the smaller but potentially
more informed and more organized ‘Elites’. But if the Masses don’t know
and their vote splits in the middle, then the Elites might well swing the vote
to their advantage.
This is where asking one’s peers and pursing one’s interest in solidarity
might help. Solidarity is typically understood as a value appealed to in the
context of collective action (Kolers, 2016; Sangiovanni, 2015). The Masses
1There are, of course, many other good reasons for listening to those with differing or
opposing interests. My question here is exclusively focused on information aggregation
for predicting a correct choice under the assumption that different choices are correct for
different individuals.
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can overcome oppression or domination by the Elites if they act in solidarity
in their joint pursuit of change. But there is a different aspect to solidarity
that has been discussed less often, but which is in an important sense prior to
collective action: solidarity can also help to identify what the Masses really
want. To clarify their interests, the Masses can practice epistemic solidarity.
They can pool the information they hold individually in a pre-election ballot
and then successfully commit to vote for the result of their pre-ballot, making
use of the dispersed information they hold. If they do, the Masses will not
only have a good chance to identify what is in their interest (because of
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and related results: Condorcet 1785), they are
also likely to outvote the Elites because they coordinate their vote.
For a practical example, consider the Greek bailout referendum of 2015
called on the reform proposals of the ‘institutions’ (formerly known as the
‘troika’). It might well be the case that the answer in the interest of the
Greek Elites differed from the answer in the interest of the Masses (perhaps
further austerity was good for the Elites but disastrous for the Masses, or,
vice versa, perhaps risking default was disastrous for the Masses but the
best option for the Elites, etc.; I do not intend to defend any view on this
complicated matter). In the face of daunting complexity, the first challenge
for the Masses is to find out whether it is better for them to vote Yes or No.
That is not an easy task, but it may be a challenge they can meet if they
practice epistemic solidarity: pool what they know individually, and then all
vote along the lines of the pooling result.
The Masses are, in principle, able to outvote the Elites if the Masses suc-
ceed in pooling their information. More precisely, a majority of people who
have the same interests but are individually not very competent in identify-
ing their most preferred alternative can find out with great reliability which
alternative is best for them if they take a majority vote among themselves.
However, in order to identify their preferred choice in the majority vote, the
Masses first have to find out ‘who is with them’, i.e. who their true epistemic
peers are. This may well be the greater challenge for the Masses: if they
are individually not very good at identifying which alternative is in their
interest, they may also find it difficult to know who they can trust to provide
information based on the interest of the Masses.
The Elites, by contrast, may have a few aces up their sleeves: they may
be more competent individually, they might be able to spend more time and
make an effort to find out who is ‘with them’, they tend to ‘know people who
know’, they are probably socially more mobile, and they often dominate the
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public discourse. This helps the Elites to identify their true epistemic peers,
vote for their preferred alternative as a block, and perhaps even confuse the
Masses about their choice. If the Masses remain divided while the Elites
coordinate their votes, the Elites can impose their minority interests on the
group.
In this paper I investigate how the search for true epistemic peers might
turn out to be more or less successful for the Masses and the Elites, how
this influences the practice of epistemic solidarity, and how these differential
capacities to find peers can lead to what I call Epistemic Network Injustice.
I will show that, when the playing field is level, the Masses are in a strong
position. However, more often than not the playing field is not level. The
Elites are often much better organized as a group, not only because they
are smaller, but also because they have more resources available to identify
their true peers and coordinate their votes. If the Elites are organized and
the Masses are divided, the Elites have a good chance of winning. This
phenomenon, I will show, links up with a renewed interest in structural
injustice, especially the literature on propaganda and ideology. The notion
of Epistemic Network Injustice captures settings in which individuals are
disadvantaged by their inferior epistemic position in their communication
network, which makes it harder for them to form beliefs about what is in
their own best interest.
The paper begins in section II with an explanation of how groups form
and change membership on a network. Section III introduces a simple base-
line model, while section IV provides several extensions, showing that the
competition between Elites and Masses depends on successful peer group
formation. Section V offers a definition of Epistemic Network Injustice and
explores the relation to other forms of epistemic injustice, while section VI
concludes.
2 Finding Your True Epistemic Peers
What can individuals do when looking for a good epistemic peer group, a
group of people with shared interests? Finding a good peer group would be
easy if all the true peers were clearly marked, by green beards, for example.
That is not particularly plausible. In practice, identifying one’s true peers
is tricky. This is for two reasons. First, even if individuals know what their
fundamental interests are, they do not reliably know what these fundamental
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interests entail for the concrete decision at hand. Second, when observing
others they cannot (normally) see what their fundamental interests are, they
only see their views about the concrete decisions to be made.
For example, if individuals 1 and 2 agree on whether they should support
alternative A or B that might be because they have the same fundamental
interests and are both right (or both mistaken) in identifying the choice
their shared interest entails, but it might also be because they have different
interests and either 1 or 2 are mistaken about what their respective interests
entail. Agreeing on the concrete alternative to be supported is therefore only
very imperfect evidence for aligned fundamental interest.
The technical foundations of this paper go back to Condorcet’s jury the-
orem (see, for instance, Grofman et al., 1983; List and Goodin, 2001; Goodin
and Spiekermann, 2018). Put very briefly, Condorcet’s jury theorem says the
probability of a correct group majority grows with group size and converges
to 1 if the voters are competent and the votes are independent.2 However,
unlike the Condorcetian setting, I allow for a person-relative standard of cor-
rectness, so that the correct answers for Elites and Masses can differ. This
idea of multiple truth standards was first introduced by Miller (1986). Gold-
man (1999, chapter 10) independently linked diverging standards to social
epistemology in a democratic setup. This idea was later formalized by List
and Spiekermann (2016). The idea of epistemic solidarity stems from Goodin
and Spiekermann (2015), but they only look at a static setting in which both
groups know who their peers are. The present paper goes substantially be-
yond the static setup by making group formation endogenous.
I begin by introducing the fundamental building blocks of the model. Let
there be a set of voters V = {1, . . . , n}. The number of voters is finite, so
that n <∞. In my simple model, each voter is either of the Elite (E) or the
Mass (M) type. More formally, a voter i has one type T (i) ∈ {E,M}. The
number of Elite voters is e = #{i ∈ V : T (i) = E} and the number of Mass
voters is m = #{i ∈ V : T (i) =M}, such that n = e+m.
To model epistemic dependence, the relationship between the individuals
is represented as a network. A network consists of nodes, and some pairs
of nodes are connected by edges (sometimes called links). Let the nodes
represent individual voters, so that the set of nodes is V . We represent
2The problems with both assumptions, but especially the independence assumption,
are discussed in detail in the literature on the Condorcet jury theorem. See Dietrich and
Spiekermann (ming) for a brief review.
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Figure 1: A simple network with epistemic peer groups.
the network as an undirected graph G(V, L), with L being the edges in the
graph. An edge (i, j) exists if and only if voter i communicates with j and j
with i. The edges are symmetric (undirected), so that two connected agents
always communicate in both directions. In other words, an edge between two
individuals means that these two agents learn from their respective neighbour
which alternative they think is the right one, prior to pooling any information.
The epistemic peer group of an individual is all the individuals that are
directly connected, that is, the neighbourhood of the agent on the network.
More formally, let the neighborhood of a voter i ∈ V be Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈
L} ∪ {i}. This means that all voters directly connected to i are part of the
neighbourhood, and i is assumed to be part of the neighbourhood, too.
Note well that an epistemic peer group does not always consist only of
true epistemic peers. Each individual may have members in their peer group
that do not share the same fundamental interests. Figure 1 shows a small
network. Individual 1 has 2, 3, and 4 as peers, as these are connected with
edges to 1. Individual 2 has 1, 5, 6, and 7 as peers. While 1 and 2 have
each other in their respective peer groups, this does not mean that their peer
groups are identical; they listen to different peers.
The model rests on some core assumptions. First, as we have seen, all
agents have a fixed type: either ‘Elite’ or ‘Mass’. This type determines
their (fundamental) interest. For simplicity I assume that Elites and Masses
always have diverging interests.
Second, prior to each vote, it is randomly determined which of the two
available alternatives is the correct alternative, that is, the one in the inter-
est of the Masses and the Elites, respectively. Formally, in each round an
equiprobable state of nature θ ∈ {0, 1} is drawn that determines the correct
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answer cE(θ) for the Elites and cM(θ) for the Masses:
θ = 0 θ = 1
cE(θ) 1 0
cM(θ) 0 1
Third, the agents have opinions (private signals), which depend proba-
bilistically on what is the right alternative for them in the present vote. In
each round, each voter i receives a signal about the correct answer for them,
and they form an opinion oi ∈ {0, 1} about the correct answer according to
competence pE for Elites or pM for the Masses such that pE = Pr(oi = cE(θ))
for each Elite voter i and pM = Pr(oj = cM(θ)) for each Mass voter j with
pE, pM ∈ (0, 1). The competence is the probability to form the correct opin-
ion about the alternative that is in the agent’s objective interest, and these
competence parameters remain the same for both possible states. This com-
petence assumption is similar to the competence assumption of Condorcet’s
jury theorem, but in the present paper the individuals are competent if they
are better than random at tracking their objectively best alternative (de-
pending on their type), while in Condorcet’s theorem the same external truth
applies to everyone in the same way.
Finally, votes are the result of the opinions of the agents in the neigh-
bourhood (the epistemic peer group) because we assume that individuals
take into account the views of their neighbours before voting. In this sim-
ple model, individuals use the information their neighbours hold in a very
straightforward manner: An agent connected to other agents votes for the
opinion of the majority (including himself) in his immediate neighborhood,
his epistemic peer group. If there is a tie of opinions in the peer group, then
the tie is broken by the toss of a fair coin. One could say that each agent
votes for the most supported alternative in his neighborhood. If an agent is
unconnected (without peers), he votes according to his own signal, of course.
Formally, this leads to the following rule to determine an individual i’s vote:
1 if
∑
x∈Ni
ox >
#Ni
2
vi = 0 if
∑
x∈Ni
ox <
#Ni
2
coin toss {0,1} otherwise.
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Figure 2: Examples of an unconnected graph, and complete subgraphs among
the masses and the elites.
One nice feature of the network model is that it includes completely
pooled and completely unpooled voting as special cases. If no opinions are
pooled, the voters (nodes) are on an empty graph with no edges – everyone
votes according to their own signals only, as in Figure 2a. (I represent the
Elite voters as black, the Mass voters as white nodes.) If the Masses show
perfect epistemic solidarity while the Elites do not, this can be represented
as a complete graph of all Mass agents (a complete graph is a graph in which
every node is connected to every node), and a separate empty graph with all
Elite agents, as in figure 2b. And if only the Elites pool their votes perfectly,
the Elite agents form a complete graph and all Mass agents are in a separate
empty graph, as in figure 2c.
With all other central elements in place, it is time to consider how true
epistemic peers find each other. I consider some simple but suggestive mech-
anisms for making the formation of peer groups endogenous. Looking at
several dynamics of group formation provides us with clues which factors
may enable the Elites or Masses to identify a good epistemic peer group to
use for information pooling in order to win the vote.
What interests me is, in effect, a dynamic mechanisms of network change
based on the information the individuals gather about their neighbours. I
explore several simple processes for changing the network, i.e. for edge dele-
tion and creation. To keep matters tractable, I assume that, while agents
do not know with certainty what the best alternative for them is ex ante,
they do know ex post, after each vote, what the best choice was (or would
have been). In other words, the assumption here is that the correctness of
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one’s own decision can be assessed easily with hindsight. This means that a
voter i knows, ex post, whether the opinions of i’s neighbours were correct
or incorrect according to i’s standard of correctness. This is, of course, an
important simplification, but, as we will see, the voters are still challenged to
find their peers – weakening this assumption would make it even harder. One
can think of this aspect of the model as a sort of learning about neighbours
by trial-and-error.
Each simulation run consists of many rounds. A round starts with the
determination of the correct alternative for the Masses and for the Elites. All
agents then form opinions about which of the two alternatives is correct, in
line with the competence parameters. Each agent (node) pools the opinions
in the neighborhood and casts a vote accordingly. After this election, the
network change process sets in: a subset of 10% randomly chosen agents has
the opportunity to delete an edge to one of their neighbors. One can interpret
this as a social process that lets some individuals respond to disagreements
with the other individuals they interact with: after a disagreement, they
sometimes cut the social connection and will no longer take the opinion of
that individual into account.
I explore several simple rules that the individuals might use to decide
which link to cut. In all cases, the deleted edges are replaced by new edges
between randomly chosen individuals (thereby keeping the overall number of
edges constant), assuming that new acquaintances are random encounters. I
also assume that the link carrying capacity of nodes is only limited by the
number of other nodes available, that is, if a node is linked with all other
nodes, it cannot form more links. Self-loops and multiple edges between the
same pair of nodes are ruled out.
My highly simplified network change process can be summarized in pseudo
code. The decisive procedure to be defined is the delete edge choice pro-
cedure, the way how agents choose to which of their neighbors they want to
cut their link:
set run nodes as a random subset of 10% of all nodes
for each node in run nodes:
choose 0 or 1 adjacent edge by delete edge choice
if 1 edge chosen:
delete this edge
draw new edge between two unconnected random nodes in network
In the next two sections, I investigate several possible renderings of the
delete edge choice procedure and explore under which conditions Elites and
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Masses manage to find suitable epistemic peer groups, and how that influ-
ences their likelihood to win votes.
3 A Simple Baseline Model
To obtain a simple baseline model, suppose, unrealistically, that after each
vote individuals do not only learn which alternative was the correct one
for them, all individuals also learn about which alternative was best for all
other individuals. Who is with you and who is against you is then fully
transparent.3 This is clearly a much too optimistic assumption about what
the agents know about themselves and each other, and I will investigate more
realistic and interesting settings below. Nevertheless, it is a useful starting
point for understanding the dynamics of the model.
Given what the individuals know, it is clear what they will do: if it’s an
individual’s turn to delete an edge, they will choose to cut a link to an agent
with different interest (and not delete any edge if all their neighbors have the
same interest). That way all individuals try to create a more homogeneous
neighborhood in which the pooled votes are more likely to track their correct
alternative in the next round.
Here and in all following simulations I begin with a random network con-
stituted by 100 nodes and 300 edges, so that the edges are initially randomly
arranged between the nodes.4 Multiple edges between the same two agents,
and self-loops (edges to oneself) are not allowed. Of the 100 nodes, 30 rep-
resent Elite and 70 Mass voters.
Unsurprisingly, the network dynamics arising from the baseline model
lead to a very quick separation of Mass and Elite agents. Since all agents
recognize each other’s type and remove links to agents that are not their
type, the network quickly separates Masses and Elites and divides into two
separate components. Once that separation is completed, the network has
reached a stable state, as no agent has an incentive to delete any further
edges and consequently no new edges are added. Figure 3 shows a typical
development after 0, 20, 40, and 60 rounds.
The stable state on the right of figure 3 is typical for the outcome in the
3What is not transparent is which alternative is in an agent’s interest in the next round
because which alternative is best for which type can change from round to round. This is
why it is still useful to pool opinions with epistemic peers.
4This is a Erdo˝s–Re´nyi G(n,M) model after Erdo˝s and Re´nyi 1959.
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Figure 3: Development of the baseline model, showing network after 0, 20,
40 and 60 rounds (from left to right).
baseline model. Note that the Mass agents are now more strongly connected
than the Elite agents and therefore pool their information in larger groups.
To measure this effect systematically, we can investigate how the network
topology affects the probability of Elite and Mass agents to vote for their
preferred alternative.
I begin with the assumption that Elite voters recognize the alternative
in their interest a bit more often than Mass voters do. I can then explore
whether Mass voters can nevertheless beat the smaller but more competent
Elites by practising epistemic solidarity. So suppose that an Elite voter on
her own has probability pE = 0.7 to vote for her preferred alternative, while
a Mass voter has probability pM = 0.6. Pooling opinions with voters of the
same type increases (and pooling with voters of the opposite kind decreases)
the probability of voting for the correct alternative.
Figure 4 visualizes the epistemic effect of pooling the votes in one such
simulation. It shows the distribution of pooled competence for the initial
(left) and the final network topology (right) after one simulation with 100
rounds. The distributions indicate how well the different voters are expected
to do epistemically, given the neighbors they have. Each bar represents an
expected pooled competence of the agent, given the distribution of types in
their neighbourhood. It answers the question: how likely is it for an agent
to vote correctly, given the peer group he relies on? The expected pooled
competence is a measure of how large and how good the peer group is. Pooled
competence is highest if an agent has found many true peers and avoids being
connected to “false” peers that do not share the same interests. The formal
statement of how pooled competence is calculated is not difficult but a little
involved; it can be found in online Appendix A.
In the beginning, both Elite and Mass agents have a lot of variance in their
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Figure 4: Distribution of pooled competence of Elites (black) and Masses
(grey) with initial and steady state topology for baseline model. Bold lines
are averages of the competence resulting from pooling, separately for Elites
and Masses.
pooled competence because they tend to be connected to their adversaries
to different degrees, dragging down the reliability of their pooled votes. The
change in pooled competence, when drawing on neighbours, can be seen by
looking at the averages of both groups, drawn as bold lines in figure 4.
After the network has gone through a revision process of 100 rounds,
Elites and Masses are separated entirely and the network reaches a steady
state. Both pooled competence averages increase compared to the initial
state. The reason is that the separation of Mass and Elite voters benefits
most voters, as they are now pooling exclusively with their own type. But
the Elites benefit more, once they lose all edges to the Masses. In the steady
state, most Elite agents have a higher individual competence, giving them
an advantage.
The result for this one round is a typical outcome. Across 1000 simu-
lations, the Elites end up with an average pooled competence of 0.79, the
Masses with 0.72. However, in terms of the election, the Elites still do com-
paratively poorly. In 1000 simulations, the Elites win 24% of votes in the
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steady states.5 This is actually worse then what the Elites could expect with-
out any network change. Pooling with the initial random network gives the
Elites electoral success in about 43% of cases. This is because the pooled
competence for all agents in the initial state is so low that the Masses often
‘accidentally’ vote for the Elite interest. The result shows that a separation
of the two groups is not necessarily in the interest of the Elites; an elec-
tion in which everyone pools confusing and contradictory opinions allows the
Elite minority to succeed more often than they would if their opponents were
more unified. However, unless the Masses are totally incompetent in their
edge deletion strategy, the Elites are probably not able to preserve the initial
‘pooling chaos’ of the random network.
4 Learning From Experience
The baseline model is unrealistic because it assumes that the correct alter-
native for each agent is perfectly visible to all agents after each vote. It is
therefore no surprise to find a complete separation of Mass and Elite agents
— they recognize each other without error. The next model variations come
with less demanding assumptions about what the individuals find out about
their peers. In the next set of simulations the agents perfectly know what
was in their own objective interest after each vote (with hindsight), but they
can only infer from the opinions expressed by a neighbor in the last round
whether that neighbor shares their own interest (or whether she is of a dif-
ferent type). After all, the neighbor may have been wrong, ex ante, about
his own correct alternative, expressing what the agent sees retrospectively as
the ‘right’ opinion but not really share the agent’s interests; or vice versa.
This makes it much harder to find ‘like-minded’ agents to pool information
with, as previous opinions are not a very reliable indicator of their type, as
long as the competence parameter is not close to 1.
To put this a bit more precisely, the delete edge choice procedure works
as follows in this model:
1. Find all neighbors whose last opinion differs from one’s own correct
alternative in the previous round;
2. If this set is non-empty, delete edge to one of those neighbors (random
choice if there are several); otherwise do nothing.
5Votes that result in a tie are broken with the toss of a fair coin.
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Using the other parameters as above, I find that Elites and Masses are now
much less successful in separating into homogeneous groups. Even after
letting the simulation run for a long time (1000 rounds), there are still many
links between Elites and Masses. Consequently, the quality of the pooled
results is reduced; average pooled competence hovers around 0.6 for both
groups. This means that the Masses still win the elections most of the time:
in 1000 simulations, they do so 58% of the time, doing about as well as they
would without any network change.
The reason why information pooling failed in the previous model is the
agents’s very short memory, combined with their limited competence. Since
Elites vote against their correct alternative 30% and Masses 40% of the time,
looking merely at the last opinion expressed by their neighbours means that
agents often keep links to the ‘wrong’ neighbors or sever links to the ‘right’
neighbors.
As a next step, I explore what happens if I give both Masses and Elites
a memory of 5 previous rounds. To be more precise, all agents can recall the
last 5 opinions of agents they were continuously connected with in the last
5 rounds (but forget all information about former neighbors as soon as they
get disconnected).
The delete edge choice procedure is now this:
1. Rank all neighbors of agent i according to their rate of agreement with
what were the correct choices for i in the previous 5 rounds;
2. If there are agents with a rate of agreement < 1/2 , sever link to the
agent with the lowest rate (or, in case of a tie, one of those agents
chosen randomly).6
With a longer memory, both Masses and Elites are more successful in creat-
ing homogeneous pooling groups, and their epistemic performance changes
accordingly. Figure 5 shows a typical competence distribution before and
after one simulation with 1000 rounds.
The overall average competence after 1000 such simulations was 73% for
the Elites and 65% for the Masses, showing that both groups are making
(modest) gains compared to their individual competence. Since both groups
gain epistemically, it is unsurprising that the Masses still win most of the
votes (measured at the end of the 1000 rounds): the Masses succeed in 64%
of those elections.
6The Python code for this approach is provided in online Appendix B.
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Figure 5: Distribution of pooled competence of Elites (black, competence
0.7) and Masses (grey, competence 0.6) with initial and end of simulation
topology after 1000 rounds for memory of 5 for both Elites and Masses.
Bold lines are averages.
However, this result changes quite dramatically if the difference in com-
petence between Masses and Elites is more pronounced. With a higher level
of competence, the Elites can recognize each other more reliably, as the Elites
tend to vote more often in alignment with their objective interest. Figure
6 shows the pooled competence distribution before and after the network
dynamics unfolding for Elite competence pE = 0.8 and Mass competence
pM = 0.6. The difference between the pre- and post-simulation distribu-
tion is striking: the Elites see a sharp increase in their pooled competence
(to 93% on average in 1000 simulations), while the Masses can increase their
competence only modestly (to 63%). This increase allows the Elite to achieve
majorities in 67% of cases.
An interesting variation of the memory parameter setting arises if one
differentiates between Elites and Masses. In this next set of simulations, I give
Masses a memory of 1 and the Elites a memory of 5. One can interpret this
setting as a simulation of ‘more discerning’ Elites — they choose the agents
they interact with more carefully, based on a longer period of experience.
Figure 7 shows a typical probability distribution of pooled competences
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Figure 6: Distribution of pooled competence of Elites (black, competence
0.8) and Masses (grey, competence 0.6) with initial and end of simulation
topology after 1000 rounds for memory of 5 for both Elites and Masses.
Bold lines are averages.
before and after a simulation with 1000 rounds. Individual competences for
the Masses are 0.6 and for the Elites 0.7. Compared to figure 4, we see
an increase in the average competence of the Elites beyond their individual
competence, while the Masses do not improve much compared to their in-
dividual performance. One can also note that at the end of the simulation
almost all Elite agents do well epistemically, certainly better than 1/2 , and
most of them better than their individual competence. Many Mass agents,
by contrast, do poorly in their attempt to pool information. This is due to
the fact that the Elites are now quite strongly connected between each other,
while many Mass agents have a mix of links to Mass and Elite agents, which
reduces their pooled competence.
In 1000 simulations, the Elites reach an average pooled competence of
75%, the Masses of 60%. This is also reflected when counting the winners
of the elections at the end of the simulations: about 51% are won by the
Elites, who are now punching much above their numerical weight, due to
their successful information pooling. If I increase the memory of the Elites
further, to 10 previous periods, the pooled Elite competence increases to 80%
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Figure 7: Distribution of pooled competence of Elites (black, competence
0.7) and Masses (grey, competence 0.6) with initial and end of simulation
topology after 1000 rounds for memory of 5 (Elites) and 1 (Masses). Bold
lines are averages.
(Masses: 60%) and the Elites win 60% of elections.
A more pronounced difference in competence (Elites 0.8 and Masses 0.6)
leads to even more successful Elites. With a memory of 5 for Elites and 1 for
the Masses, the 30 Elite agents dominate the elections after they successfully
formed their pooling groups: they win in about 88% of cases, as compared
to a baseline of 64% priot to any network changes.
Table 1 takes stock of the simulation results. The most important upshot
is that the Elites have a chance of winning despite their minority position.
This is likely to happen if they are either significantly more competent or
more discerning due to their superior memory of past interactions. It can
also happen if the Elites benefit from the confusion of the Masses, especially
if the Masses do not manage to exercise epistemic solidarity. By contrast, if
the Masses succeed in pooling the information they hold, they are very likely
to win votes.
The model could be extended in many directions, making the network
larger, starting with different constellations, thinking about the effect of di-
17
pE pM Elites winning
Initial network 0.7 0.6 43%
Types recognised (Baseline) 0.7 0.6 24%
Memory 1 for both 0.7 0.6 42%
Memory 5 for both 0.7 0.6 36%
Masses Memory 1, Elites 5 0.7 0.6 51%
Masses Memory 1, Elites 10 0.7 0.6 60%
Initial network 0.8 0.6 64%
Memory 5 for both 0.8 0.6 67%
Masses Memory 1, Elites 5 0.8 0.6 88%
Table 1: Summary of Simulations, each estimate of Elite winning frequency
based on 1000 simulations.
rected edges, or giving Masses and Elites different link carrying capacities.7
However, the main goal of these simple simulations is not realism but rather
to help us see that the domination of the Masses by a smaller but well-
informed and organized Elite is possible.
5 Epistemic Network Injustice
The simulations presented in the previous section give us a sense of how
the Masses might become epistemically dominated by the Elites in specific
circumstances. The simulations paint a suggestive picture, a picture that has
been painted in other, less formal ways in the recent literature on ideology
and propaganda. In this section, I briefly look at these recent contributions,
with a special focus on their epistemic underpinning. I then state and explain
a definition of epistemic network injustice.
Consider Jason Stanley’s (2017) observation that ‘[s]ome flawed ideolo-
gies will be democratically problematic, because they lead to widespread
theoretical irrationality, which typically results in failure to track one’s own
interest...’ (p. 216). Stanley presupposes an epistemic standard that deter-
mines one’s own interests and that one can fail to live up to that standard,
just like the model framework in the present paper. He also thinks that it
is the ‘Elite’ who can influence results to their advantage: ‘It is natural to
7I am grateful to a referee for pointing out this possible variation.
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think that the elite maintain power by promulgating the flawed ideology that
their interests are the interests of the society at large’ (p. 232).
In that respect, Stanley is in agreement with Sally Haslanger (2017),
whose ‘epistemic critique of ideology reveals the distortion, occlusion and
misrepresentation of the facts’ (p. 150). Her work is but one example of
a general shift of focus in political theory. An unjust society used to be
conceived, at least in its most paradigmatic instantiations, as a society with
unjust formal institutions. More recently, however, political theorists have
turned towards the effects of informal arrangements, such as social norms,
prejudice, or subtle forms of discrimination. What is needed to address
these types of injustice, in addition to state action, is a change in culture.
Specifically, cultural practices provide us with “resources for agency” (p. 154)
that we will need to draw upon to resist ideology. A lack of such resources,
by contrast, may “prevent us from appreciating what’s morally relevant” (p.
159). This lack can constitute unjust structures, and the epistemic dimension
of injustice connects to the political dimension.
The upshot from Stanley’s and Haslanger’s work in the context of this
paper is twofold. First, both analyse the distortions of ideology at least
partly in epistemic terms and appeal to a standard of correctness for that
purpose. Second, they diagnose a structural epistemic problem. While they
do not explicitly state the problem in terms of epistemic networks, the simple
models presented in the previous section shed light on some aspects of the
‘distortions’ at play.
Advantaged groups might have many epistemic aces up their sleeve. They
often already get born into a quality information network, growing up with
family friends who are lawyers, doctors, academics, journalists, or politicians.
They have every chance to maintain and improve on that network by getting
to know more qualified peers. If necessary, they can buy expertise in the form
of lawyers, financial advisors, or consultants.8 And finally, being advantaged
typically means having time resources to investigate what is in one’s own best
interest, while less advantaged people often have their bandwith absorbed by
the necessities of life they cannot ‘outsource’ to others, from childcare to
cooking or cleaning (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2014; Goodin et al., 2013).
The causal processes described just now stand for a certain sub-type of
injustice, an injustice that arises due to specific mechanisms that lead to
8For a review of the sociology of elite networks and elite knowledge resources, see Khan
2012, with further references.
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‘crippled epistemologies’ (Hardin, 2002) for some and richer epistemologies
for others.
I suggest to call this particular type of injustice epistemic network injus-
tice and define it as follows:
Epistemic Network Injustice. A society experiences epistemic network
injustice if
(i) there is a subset of citizens that, through no fault of their own, is
systematically deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers
and/or is systematically misled by epistemic non-peers,
(ii) due to the structure of the communication network;
(iii) such that the ability of the subset members to identify their own
political interests is compromised.
Conditions (i) and (ii) state the structural source of the injustice: a commu-
nication network structure that deprives a group of individuals of connections
to peers that could help them make decisions in their own best interest. This
could, in more extreme cases, also involve connections to non-peers that con-
fuse or mislead.9 Condition (i) contains a responsibility caveat. Groups that
deliberately choose to have disadvantageous peer connections do not expe-
rience injustice (though they do experience epistemic disadvantage). For
example, a religious group that banishes any form of news media from their
life might find that they are epistemically disadvantaged, but, given that
their choices cause this network structure, they cannot claim to experience
injustice. Condition (iii) spells out the implications of a problematic network
structure. Compared to others, members of the group have a reduced chance
to work out which political choices are in their best interest.
It is important to see that there are potentially two different injustices at
work. The epistemic injustice consists in the reduced ability of the disadvan-
taged subjects to work out what is in their own best interest, caused by the
communication network they are embedded in. But while the problem starts
9A referee for this journal pointed out that the model runs shown earlier lead to epis-
temic disadvantage not only because of network structures, but also because the Masses
were disadvantaged in other respects such as competence or memory. This is correct – the
models show the emergence of Epistemic Network Injustice due to other initial disadvan-
tages. But it is easy to imagine that, once the unjust network structures are established,
they can persist to do harm even if the initial disadvantages that made them emerge
disappear. More modelling work in that regard has to wait for another time.
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with an epistemic inequality, this will likely lead to non-epistemic injustice in
the form of political inequality. And being deprived of equal political power
can have economic inequality in its tow. Political and economic inequality
as a result of epistemic injustice are caused by epistemic injustice, but the
epistemic injustice and the other injustices following from it are analytically
distinct.
The main focus of the epistemic injustice literature has been on ‘discrim-
inatory epistemic injustice’ (Fricker, 2013; Coady, 2010), especially testimo-
nial and hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007). But there is also a distinctly
distributive form of epistemic injustice, concerned with the way epistemic
goods are distributed. Epistemic network injustice is of this distributive
kind. The epistemic resource at stake is the ability to access truth-conducive
information in the network. Discrimination, by contrast, is not a necessary
condition for epistemic network injustice because it is conceivable that the
network structure is not the result of discriminatory preferences. Instead, it
might be a coincidental side effect of other social processes. However, even
though discrimination is not necessary, it is plausible that discrimination
often plays a role in the emergence of the problematic network structures.
Finally, I will consider two objections to the definition of Epistemic Net-
work Injustice as presented. One may object, first, that Epistemic Network
Injustice is not a form of injustice, as there is often no perpetrator; the injus-
tice arises from structural properties of the communication network. How-
ever, one needs to consider the notion of justice appealed to. As explained
above, Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice, and especially hermeneutical
injustice, is based on a structural understanding of injustice (Young, 1990).
This is closely analogous to the case of Fricker’s hermeneutical injustice,
where there is often no specific person to blame for the systematic disadvan-
tages that affect some groups (Fricker, 2007, p. 161). Epistemic Network
Injustice is similarly structural. Admittedly, on a narrow understanding of
justice, Epistemic Network Injustice is better described as a disadvantage and
not an injustice. But such a narrow understanding of the notion of justice
robs the concept much of its critical potential when it comes to the causal
effects of structures.
A second, libertarian objection to Epistemic Network Injustice insists that
structures arising from voluntary choices cannot be unjust.10 As the network
structures arise from individual choices, the argument goes, no injustice has
10I would like to thank a referee for pressing me on this point.
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occured. This is not the place to revisit this well-reheared debate in detail.
But it is worth noting that Epistemic Network Injustice might affect agents
who have not made any choices about network structures themselves. In-
dividuals might find themselves in epistemically disadvantaged positions for
purely structural reasons: because they cannot find or connect with their
peers, because powerful influencers have confused their peers, or because
someone else was able to influence network structures to their own advan-
tage. More fundamentally, the concept of Epistemic Network Injustice shows
that the voluntariness of choices alone does not ensure just outcomes. It also
matters that individuals are in a good position to make choices that advance
their own interests in the first place.
6 Conclusion
Epistemic solidarity can be a tool for the Masses to identify which alternative
best promotes their interest and use their greater number to win elections.
But this optimistic picture comes with a catch: before epistemic solidarity
can work, like-minded agents have to find each other, and avoid including
other agents with different interests in their pooling process. Collecting the
input of one’s true epistemic peers, and only those, is not easy.
The simple models presented here, while still far-removed from the com-
plex reality of epistemic peer group formation, are nevertheless suggestive.
They demonstrate that a reshaping of the epistemic peer network can change
the epistemic success of different groups — sometimes dramatically so. Im-
portant factors for epistemic success are the ability to form a group of true
peers and the size of that group.
One outcome is of special interest from a democratic perspective: the
possibility that a smaller group of more knowledgeable or more organized
individuals with a minority interest outvotes the majority. Normally, this
should not happen: even if the Masses are less competent they should still
be able to outvote the Elites, as long as they manage to organize a pre-vote en
bloc and then stick to that pre-vote, practising epistemic solidarity. But there
are good reasons to believe that the Elites are advantaged in many ways: they
tend to ‘know the people in the know’, they tend to be well-connected, and
they are smaller, which often makes collective action easier to organize. My
simulations uncover several ways how the Elites might dominate the Masses.
Even if the Elites are not more competent in recognizing each other directly,
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they might have other advantages, such as a better memory to identify their
peers, or a higher competence that makes it easier to recognize each other.
Under such conditions the smaller group tends to succeed in coordinating
their vote while the larger group is often divided and confused.
Exploring the dynamics of epistemic solidarity shows that there is an
epistemic aspect to power and collective action that is often forgotten. The
problem is not only to act collectively, the problem is to identify the best
action, or, in more Marxist terms, to overcome false consciousness. If indi-
viduals are stuck in crippled networks, they can become victims of Epistemic
Network Injustice. Being epistemically dependent on one’s peers is thus a
mixed blessing — only if one succeeds in finding one’s true peers can one
effectively identify one’s own interests and make them heard.
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Appendix A: Calculation of Pooled Compe-
tence
A voter i has neighbourhood N(i). Let the cardinality of that neighbourhood
be n(i). Let the number of Elite types in N(i) be e(i) and the number of
Mass types be m(i). The pooled competence of the neighborhood for voter
i depends on the number of Mass and Elite voters in the neighbourhood.
We are interested in the likelihood of majorities that identify the correct
interest of i. Let there be a set K of all possible ordered pairs 〈vE, vM〉 with
vE representing the number Elite types in N(i) voting in the interest of the
Elites and vM the Mass types voting in the interest of the Masses under the
constraints that 0 ≤ vE ≤ e(i), 0 ≤ vM ≤ m(i). Each tuple represents a
possible outcome of Elite types and Mass types voting in a specific way and
the set of all tuples represents all possible ways for the Elites and the Mass
votes in the neighbourhood to go.
Case 1: Voter i is a Mass Type
In this case we are interested in a subset of K, namely all elements in which
the Mass interest gains a majority. Let this subset be
OM =
{
all 〈vE, vM〉 ∈ K : e(i)− vE + vM >
n(i)
2
}
.
Call the event of a majority for the Masses in that neighbourhood MW. For
the calculations to follow, it is useful to recall the standard binomial formula
for the probability of x successes out of n draws with success probability p:
(
P (n, x, p) =
nxpx(1− p)n−x.
)
The probability of all possible vote combinations from the Elites and Mass
types in such that the Masses win is:
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Pr(MW) =
∑
all 〈vE ,vM 〉∈OM
P (e(i), vE, pE)× P (m(i), vM , pM).
Since tied outcomes are decided by coin toss, we need to calculate the
probability of making the correct choice for the Masses by coin toss. Call
this event T. We are now interested in the subset OT of K that leads to ties:
MT =
{
all 〈vE, vM〉 ∈ K : e(i)− vE + vM =
n(i)
2
}
.
The probability of a correct vote by coin toss after a tie is:
Pr(T) =
1
2
∑
all 〈vE ,vM 〉∈OT
P (e(i), vE, pE)× P (m(i), vM , pM).
The pooled competence is Pr(MW) + Pr(T).
Case 2: Voter i as an Elite Type
The same reasoning applied symmetrically. The subset OE consists of all
tuples of Elite and Mass votes voting according to their true interest in
which the Elites obtain a majority:
OE =
{
all 〈vE, vM〉 ∈ K : vE +m(i)− vM >
n(i)
2
}
.
Call the event of a majority for the Elites in that neighbourhood EW. The
likelihood of this occuring is calculated as above:
Pr(EW) =
∑
all 〈vE ,vM 〉∈OE
P (e(i), vE, pE)× P (m(i), vM , pM).
Again, results from tie-breaking coin tosses need to be taken into account.
Pr(T) is determined just as above. The pooled competence is Pr(EW) +
Pr(T).
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Appendix B: Python Code of Main Routines
In this appendix I reproduce the main part of the Python 3 code to calculate
the results. This code is based on one simulation with memory. I have
omitted auxilliary code to count votes, record and plot results.
import networkx as nx
import random as rd
from c o l l e c t i o n s import Counter
from c o l l e c t i o n s import deque
def modes ( va lue s ) :
””” func t i on to re turn l i s t o f a l l modal va lue s ”””
count= Counter ( va lue s )
bes t = max( count . va lue s ( ) )
return [ k for k , v in count . i tems ( ) i f v == best ]
def i nd i v op in ( c ) :
””” return opinion according to competence c ”””
return int (round( rd . random ( ) + c − 0 . 5 ) )
def group opin ( ) :
””” add opinion a t t r i b u t e f o r a l l nodes ”””
for n in network . nodes ( ) :
network . node [ n ] [ ’ op in ion ’ ] = ind i v op in ( comp vector [ n ] )
def vote winner ( votes ) :
””” fo r any g iven opin ions or votes , determine winner , break t i e s by
random choice ”””
return rd . cho i c e (modes ( votes ) )
def votes ( ) :
””” determine nbh inc l ud ing ego , c o l l e c t a l l opinions , vo te f o r winner ,
break t i e randomly , s e t vo te a t t r i b u t e f o r a l l nodes ”””
for n in network . nodes ( ) :
nb = l i s t ( network [ n ] ) + [ n ]
nb v = [ network . node [ i ] [ ’ op in ion ’ ] for i in nb ]
# determine winner and break t i e s by random choice
w = rd . cho i c e (modes ( nb v ) )
network . node [ n ] [ ’ vote ’ ] = w
def mem update ( ) :
””” go through a l l edges and r e g i s t e r the opin ions o f a l l ne ighbors in the
memory a t t r i b u t e d i c t i ona ry o f network . Keep memory as a deque o f l eng t h
memlen so t ha t o ld op in ions are f o r g o t t en ”””
for e in network . edges ( ) :
#check i f t he re i s a d i c t entry in memory o f f i r s t node f o r 2nd node
i f e [ 1 ] in network . node [ e [ 0 ] ] [ ’memory ’ ] :
#i f yes , then append opinion o f 2nd node to memory o f 1 s t node
network . node [ e [ 0 ] ] [ ’memory ’ ] [ e [ 1 ] ] . append ( network . node [ e [ 1 ] ] [ ’ op in ion ’ ] )
#otherwi se c rea t e deque with t ha t opinion , s e t deque max l eng t h
else :
network . node [ e [ 0 ] ] [ ’memory ’ ] [ e [ 1 ] ] = deque (
{network . node [ e [ 1 ] ] [ ’ op in ion ’ ]} ,
maxlen=network . node [ e [ 0 ] ] [ ’memlen ’ ] )
i f e [ 0 ] in network . node [ e [ 1 ] ] [ ’memory ’ ] :
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network . node [ e [ 1 ] ] [ ’memory ’ ] [ e [ 0 ] ] . append ( network . node [ e [ 0 ] ] [ ’ op in ion ’ ] )
else :
network . node [ e [ 1 ] ] [ ’memory ’ ] [ e [ 0 ] ] = deque (
{network . node [ e [ 0 ] ] [ ’ op in ion ’ ]} ,
maxlen=network . node [ e [ 1 ] ] [ ’memlen ’ ] )
# i n i t i a l i z e
rounds = 1000
network = nx . Graph ( )
e l i t e = 30
mass = 70
nodes = e l i t e + mass
edges = 300
e l i t e comp = 0 .7
mass comp = 0 .6
# crea te vec to r o f p r o b a b o l i t y to vo te f o r E l i t e opt ion
comp vector = [ e l i t e comp ] ∗ e l i t e + [ 1 − mass comp ] ∗ mass
#de f ine how many prev ious opin ions from cont inuous l y connected nb
# the d i f f e r e n t t ypes o f agents remember
e l i te memory = 5
mass memory = 1
# make network ; 1 s tands f o r e l i t e , 0 f o r mass
for n in range ( e l i t e ) :
network . add node (n , type=1, competence=e l i t e comp ,
memory = dict ( ) , memlen = el i te memory )
for n in range ( e l i t e , mass+e l i t e ) :
network . add node (n , type=0, competence=1−mass comp ,
memory = dict ( ) , memlen = mass memory )
# add edges from an undirec ted random graph
network . add edges f rom ( nx . gnm random graph ( nodes , edges ) . edges ( ) )
# main rou t ine
for i in range ( rounds ) :
#do the opinion formation and poo led vo t ing
# note that , wi thout l o s s o f g ene ra l i t y , i t i s assumed tha t E l i t e s always
#have co r r e c t answer 1 and Masses co r r e c t answer 0
group opin ( )
votes ( )
mem update ( )
# f ind 10% of nodes
run nodes = rd . sample ( network . nodes ( ) , int (round( nodes / 10 ) ) )
#run through the se node
for n in run nodes :
max d i s a g r e e l i s t = [ ]
#only s t a r t d e l e t i n g i f a ne ighbor i s wrong at l e a s t 50% of the time
max d = 1/2 .0
# run through a l l e n t r i e s in memory
for k , m in network . node [ n ] [ ’memory ’ ] . i tems ( ) :
#ca l c u l a t e neighbour ra t e o f disagreement by comparing with type o f
#node d e l e t t i n g edge . Note t ha t agents know cor r e c t answer with
#h ind s i g h t so they can i d e n t i f y who was not vo t ing c o r r e c t l y from
#t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e
disagreement = ( len (m) − m. count ( network . node [ n ] [ ’ type ’ ] ) ) / f loat ( len (m) )
#i f t h i s ra t e h i gher than a l l found prev ious l y , s e t nb as
#nb with new h i g h e s t disagreement
i f disagreement > max d :
max d = disagreement
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max d i s a g r e e l i s t = [ k ]
# i f i t i s equa l to what has been found prev ious l y , add nb to l i s t
e l i f disagreement == max d and disagreement > 0 :
max d i s a g r e e l i s t . append (k )
i f len ( max d i s a g r e e l i s t ) > 0 :
d e l e t e t a r g e t = rd . cho i c e ( max d i s a g r e e l i s t )
network . remove edge (n , d e l e t e t a r g e t )
# when edge i s de l e t ed , d e l e t e memory o f nodes about each other
del network . node [ n ] [ ’memory ’ ] [ d e l e t e t a r g e t ]
del network . node [ d e l e t e t a r g e t ] [ ’memory ’ ] [ n ]
p a r t n e r l i s t = [ ]
#ensure to look f o r an i n i t i a t o r such t ha t an unconnected partner
#e x i s t s ( as no edge can be added to comp le t e l y connected node )
while not p a r t n e r l i s t :
# crea te new random edge
# f ind random i n i t i a t o r
i n i t i a t o r = rd . cho i c e ( l i s t ( network . nodes ( ) ) )
#f ind candidate par tners not connected to i n i t i a t o r
nb i n i t = l i s t ( network [ i n i t i a t o r ] ) + [ i n i t i a t o r ]
p a r t n e r l i s t = [ z for z in network . nodes ( ) i f z not in nb i n i t ]
partner = rd . cho i c e ( p a r t n e r l i s t )
network . add edge ( i n i t i a t o r , partner )
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